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GIFTS — GIFTS INTER VIVOS — WHETHER DELIVERY OF BILL OF SALE IS SUFFICIENT. — The defendant's wife delivered to him a bill of sale of all her personal property. She died having made no manual delivery of the property. Her administratrix sued to recover it. *Held*, that the gift to the defendant is valid. *Humphrey v. Ogden*, 125 Pac. 110 (Colo.).

Livery of seisin was originally necessary to pass title to personalty. See *Cochrane v. Moore*, 25 Q. B. D. 57, 65. Later a valid gift could be made by a deed sealed and delivered. *Wyche v. Greene*, 11 Ga. 159. The statute in Colorado declaring seals unnecessary in conveying real property, leads naturally to the decision in the principal case, as the law has in general demanded less formality in conveying personal property. See THORNTON, GIFTS, § 190, n. 1; COLO., REV. STAT., 1908, § 682. For instance, in Alabama a sealed instrument was held necessary for a valid gift in the absence of a statute abolishing seals. *Connor v. Trawick*, 37 Ala. 289. But under a statute similar to that in Colorado a written instrument was held sufficient. *Walker v. Crews*, 73 Ala. 412. This view seems just, for a man should be able to pass title to personalty in any way he wishes, provided it is sufficiently formal and definite to insure against fraud and mistake. A bill of sale formally declaring the passing of the title fulfils such requirements. The decision in the principal case seems, therefore, a convenient and safe result of the change in the importance of seals. *Tierney v. Corbett*, 2 Mackey (D. C.) 264.

HIGHWAYS — ESTABLISHMENT — PECUNIARY INTEREST OF COMMISSIONER. — A board of freeholders authorized by statute to lay out public highways decided by resolution to alter the location of a road to a position over the lands of one of its members who participated in the passage of the resolution. *Held*, that the resolution is voidable. *Van Gelder v. Freeholders of Cape May County*, 83 Atl. 500.

It is a universally recognized principle that personal interest in the subject matter of a controversy will disqualify a judge from passing thereon. *Dimes v. Grand Junction Canal Co.*, 3 H. L. Cas. 759. A distinction is made between municipal or other local resolutions relating to all the inhabitants or property within the jurisdictional limits and those which provide for improvements affecting particular individuals or property in one locality, the former being held within the legislative functions of the administrative board and the latter to be determinations judicial in nature. *State, West Jersey Traction Co. v. Board of Public Works of the City of Camden*, 56 N. J. L. 431, 29 Atl. 163. *Contra, Foot v. Stiles*, 57 N. Y. 399. Thus, as in the principal case, the acts of commissioners having an interest in the laying out of a particular highway are usually held voidable. *Petition of New Boston*, 49 N. H. 328; *State v. Delesdernier*, 11 Me. 473. But the interest must be direct. *Mitchell v. Holderness*, 29 N. H. 523. Thus the fact of being a resident of the town through which the road is to pass will not disqualify a commissioner from acting. *Inhabitants of Danvers v. County Commissioners of Essex*, 43 Mass. 185. *Cf. Monterey v. Commissioners of Berkshire*, 61 Mass. 394. It is submitted that the authorities taking a view opposite to that in the principal case limit unduly the field of judicial functions.

HUSBAND AND WIFE — RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF HUSBAND AS TO THIRD PARTIES — ACTION FOR PHYSICAL ILLNESS OF WIFE CAUSED BY PUBLICATION OF LIBELOUS WORDS. — The defendant published libelous words regarding the plaintiff's wife, and the mental anguish caused thereby resulted in her physical illness. *Held*, that the plaintiff can recover for loss of services. *Garrison v. Sun Printing and Publishing Association*, 150 N. Y. App. Div. 689.

As a general proposition, intentional harm is actionable. *Wilkinson v. Downton*, [1897] 2 Q. B. 57; *Ratcliffe v. Evans*, [1892] 2 Q. B. 524. Here the